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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-seventh session
DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC COOPERATION
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON
ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
NARCOTIC DRUGS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-seventh year

Letter dated 29 January 1992 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Philippines to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On behalf of the Permanent Representatives of the member States of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the Singapore Declaration of 1992, signed by the ASEAN Heads of State and Government at the conclusion of their summit meeting, held at Singapore on 27 and 28 January 1992 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly, under the items entitled "Development and international economic cooperation", "United Nations Conference on Environment and Development", "Human resources development", "Social development" and "Narcotic drugs", and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Manuel MENDEZ
Ambassador
Deputy Permanent Representative

ANNEX

Singapore declaration of 1992

1. We, the Heads of State and Government of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), are encouraged by the achievements of ASEAN in the last 25 years and are convinced that ASEAN cooperation remains vital to the well-being of our peoples.

2. Having reviewed the profound international political and economic changes that have occurred since the end of the Cold War and considered their implications for ASEAN, we declare that:

(a) ASEAN shall move towards a higher plane of political and economic cooperation to secure regional peace and prosperity;

(b) ASEAN shall constantly seek to safeguard its collective interests in response to the formation of large and powerful economic groupings among the developed countries, in particular through the promotion of an open international economic regime and by stimulating economic cooperation in the region;

(c) ASEAN shall seek avenues to engage member States in new areas of cooperation in security matters; and

(d) ASEAN shall forge a closer relationship based on friendship and cooperation with the Indo-Chinese countries, following the settlement on Cambodia.

Political and security cooperation

3. In the field of political and security cooperation, we have agreed that:

(a) ASEAN welcomes accession by all countries in South-East Asia to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-East Asia, which will provide a common framework for wider regional cooperation embracing the whole of South-East Asia;

(b) ASEAN will also seek the cognizance of the United Nations for the Treaty, through such means as an appropriate resolution. This will signify ASEAN's commitment to the centrality of the United Nations role in the maintenance of international peace and security, as well as promoting cooperation for socio-economic development;

(c) ASEAN could use established forums to promote external dialogues on enhancing security in the region, as well as intra-ASEAN dialogues on ASEAN security cooperation (such as the regional security seminars, held at Manila and Bangkok in 1991, and the workshops on the South China Sea, held at Bali in

1990 and Bandung in 1991), taking full cognizance of the Declaration of ASEAN Concord. To enhance this effort, ASEAN should intensify its external dialogues in political and security matters by using the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conferences (PMC);

(d) ASEAN has made major strides in building cooperative ties with States of the Asia-Pacific region and shall continue to accord them a high priority;

(e) ASEAN will seek to realize the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) and a South-East Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ) in consultation with friendly countries, taking into account changing circumstances;

(f) ASEAN will closely cooperate with the United Nations and the international community in ensuring the full implementation of the Peace Agreements signed in Paris in October 1991. ASEAN supports the Cambodian Supreme National Council in calling on the United Nations Secretary-General to despatch the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) as early as possible in order to preserve the momentum of the peace process and to implement the gains realized by the signing of the Paris Peace Agreements. ASEAN calls upon all parties in Cambodia to implement seriously the process of national reconciliation, which is essential to a genuine and lasting peace in Cambodia; and

(g) ASEAN will play an active part in international programmes for the reconstruction of Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia.

4. Conscious of the central role of the United Nations in the post-Cold War world, we agree that:

(a) The proposed summit of members of the United Nations Security Council should help shape the role of the United Nations in the promotion of a more equitable international political and economic order, and for the democratization of the decision-making processes of the United Nations in order to make the Organization truly effective in meeting its obligations;

(b) ASEAN will participate actively in efforts to ensure that the United Nations is a key instrument for maintaining international peace and security; and

(c) ASEAN will encourage all efforts to strengthen the United Nations, including its role and capabilities in peace-keeping and peace-making, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

Directions in ASEAN economic cooperation

5. In the field of economic cooperation, we have agreed that:

(a) To further accelerate joint efforts in enhancing intra-ASEAN economic cooperation, ASEAN shall adopt appropriate new economic measures, as contained in the Framework Agreement on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation directed towards sustaining ASEAN economic growth and development, which are essential to the stability and prosperity of the region;

(b) ASEAN shall establish the ASEAN Free Trade Area using the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Scheme as the main mechanism within a time-frame of 15 years beginning 1 January 1993, with the ultimate effective tariffs ranging from 0 per cent to 5 per cent. ASEAN member States have identified the following groups of products to be included in the CEPT Scheme for accelerated tariff reductions: vegetable oils; cement; chemicals; pharmaceuticals; fertilizer; plastics; rubber products; leather products; pulp; textiles; ceramic and glass products; gems and jewellery; copper cathodes; electronics; and wooden and rattan furniture;

(c) ASEAN shall increase investments, industrial linkages and complementarity by adopting new and innovative measures, as well as strengthening existing arrangements in ASEAN and providing flexibility for new forms of industrial cooperation;

(d) ASEAN shall strengthen and develop further cooperation in the field of capital markets, and shall encourage and facilitate free movement of capital and other financial resources;

(e) ASEAN shall further enhance regional cooperation to provide a safe, efficient and innovative transportation and communications infrastructure network;

(f) ASEAN shall also continue to improve and develop the intra-country postal and telecommunications system to provide cost-effective, high quality and customer-oriented services;

(g) ASEAN shall adopt joint efforts to strengthen trade promotion and negotiations on ASEAN agricultural products in order to enhance ASEAN's competitive posture, and to sustain the expansion of ASEAN agricultural exports in the international markets;

(h) ASEAN acknowledges that sub-regional arrangements among themselves, or between ASEAN member States and non-ASEAN economies, could complement overall ASEAN economic cooperation;

(i) ASEAN recognizes the importance of strengthening and/or establishing cooperation with other countries, regional/multilateral economic organizations, as well as Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and an East

Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC). With regard to APEC, ASEAN attaches importance to APEC's fundamental objective of sustaining the growth and dynamism of the Asia-Pacific region. With respect to an EAEC, ASEAN recognizes that consultations on issues of common concern among East-Asian economies, as and when the need arises, could contribute to expanding cooperation among the region's economies, and the promotion of an open and free global trading system;

(j) Further, recognizing the importance of non-tariff and non-border areas of cooperation to complement tariff liberalization in increasing regional trade and investment, ASEAN shall further explore cooperation in these areas with a view to making recommendations to the Fifth ASEAN Summit;

(k) ASEAN shall continue with its concerted efforts in the promotion of tourism, particularly in making the Visit ASEAN Year 1992 a success;

(l) ASEAN shall continue to step up cooperation in other economic-related areas, such as science and technology transfer and human resource development;

(m) ASEAN shall enhance cooperation and collective action in international and interregional forums, as well as in international organizations and regional groupings. ASEAN shall also continue to enhance relations with its dialogue partners and other producing/consuming countries towards the advancement of the commodity sector in the region and in addressing international commodity issues;

(n) ASEAN recognizes that sustained economic growth requires considerable inputs of energy. As member States continue to industrialize and strengthen their industrial base, ASEAN shall focus and strengthen cooperation in energy security, conservation and the search for alternative fuels;

(o) ASEAN recognizes the complementarity of trade and investment opportunities and therefore encourages, among others, increased cooperation and exchanges among the ASEAN private sectors, and the consideration of appropriate policies for greater intra-ASEAN investments;

(p) ASEAN shall continue to uphold the principles of free and open trade embodied in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and work towards maintaining and strengthening an open multilateral trading system;

(q) ASEAN shall work collectively to ensure that the Uruguay Round addresses the key concerns and interests of the ASEAN economies, and adopt a pragmatic and realistic approach, in using the draft Final Text as at 20 December 1991 as a reasonable basis for completing negotiations; and

(r) ASEAN strongly urges major trading countries to settle their differences on agriculture and other areas, and likewise use the draft Final Text to work towards an early and successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round.

Review of ASEAN's external relations

6. In reviewing ASEAN's external relations, we have agreed that:

(a) ASEAN, as part of an increasingly interdependent world, should intensify cooperative relationships with its dialogue partners, namely, Australia, Canada, the European Community, Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand and the United States of America, and engage in consultative relationships with interested non-dialogue countries and international organizations; and

(b) While ASEAN's cooperative relationships with the dialogue partners have made significant progress, ASEAN should strengthen existing dialogue mechanisms and develop new ones where necessary for the enhancement of economic relations with these countries, especially ASEAN's major economic partners.

ASEAN functional cooperation

7. In the field of functional cooperation, we have agreed that:

(a) The ASEAN member countries shall continue to enhance awareness of ASEAN among the people in the region through the expansion of ASEAN studies as part of South-East Asian Studies in the school and university curricula and the introduction of ASEAN student exchange programmes at the secondary and tertiary levels of education;

(b) ASEAN should help hasten the development of a regional identity and solidarity, and promote human resource development by considering ways to strengthen further the existing network of the leading universities and institutions of higher learning in the ASEAN region, with a view to ultimately establishing an ASEAN University based on this expanded network;

(c) ASEAN functional cooperation shall be designed for a wider involvement and increased participation by women in the development of the ASEAN countries in order to meet their needs and aspirations. This cooperation shall also extend to the development of children to realize their full potential;

(d) The ASEAN member countries shall continue to play an active part in protecting the environment by continuing to cooperate in promoting the principle of sustainable development and integrating it into all aspects of development;

(e) ASEAN member countries should continue to enhance environmental cooperation, particularly in issues of transboundary pollution, natural disasters, forest fires and in addressing the anti-tropical timber campaign;

(f) The developed countries should commit themselves to assist developing countries by providing them with new and additional financial resources, as well as the transfer of and access to environmentally-sound technology on concessional and preferential terms;

(g) The developed countries should also help to maintain an international environment supportive of economic growth and development;

(h) ASEAN looks forward to seeing these commitments reflected in the outcome of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in 1992 at Rio de Janeiro;

(i) As non-governmental organizations play an important role in social development, ASEAN shall encourage the exchange of information among non-governmental organizations in the region and help expand their participation in intra-ASEAN functional cooperation;

(j) ASEAN shall intensify its cooperation in overcoming the serious problem of drug abuse and illicit drug trafficking at the national, regional and international levels; and

(k) ASEAN shall make a coordinated effort in curbing the spread of AIDS by exchanging information on AIDS, particularly in the formulation and implementation of policies and programmes against the deadly disease.

Restructuring of ASEAN institutions

8. To strengthen ASEAN, we have agreed that:

(a) ASEAN Heads of Government shall meet formally every three years with informal meetings in between;

(b) The ASEAN organizational structure, especially the ASEAN secretariat, shall be streamlined and strengthened with more resources;

(c) The Secretary-General of the ASEAN secretariat shall be redesignated as the Secretary-General of ASEAN with an enlarged mandate to initiate, advise, coordinate and implement ASEAN activities;

(d) The Secretary-General of ASEAN shall be appointed on merit and accorded ministerial status;

(e) The professional staff of the ASEAN secretariat shall be appointed on the principle of open recruitment and based on a quota system to ensure representation of all ASEAN countries in the secretariat;

(f) The five present ASEAN Economic Committees shall be dissolved and the Senior Economic Officials Meeting (SEOM) shall be tasked to handle all aspects of ASEAN economic cooperation; and

(g) A ministerial-level Council shall be established to supervise, coordinate and review the implementation of the Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA).

DONE in Singapore on the 28th day of January 1992.

For Brunei Darussalam:
HAJI HASSANAL BOLKLAH
Sultan of Brunei Darussalam

For the Republic of Indonesia:
SOEHARTO
President

For Malaysia:
Dr. MAHATHIR BIN MOHAMAD
Prime Minister

For the Republic of the Philippines:
CORAZON C. AQUINO
President

For the Republic of Singapore:
GOH CHOK TONG
Prime Minister

For the Kingdom of Thailand:
ANAND PANYARACHUN
Prime Minister

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LETTER DATED 31 JANUARY 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ARGENTINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to request that you transmit to Prime Minister John Major the text of a letter dated 31 January 1992 from President Carlos Saúl Menem on the occasion of the meeting of heads of State or Government of the members of the Security Council.

I should be grateful if you would circulate this letter and its annex as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Jorge VAZQUEZ
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

ANNEX

Letter dated 31 January 1992 from the President of the Republic of Argentina addressed to the Prime Minister of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

I should like to convey to you and to the distinguished participants in this historic meeting my best and most sincere wishes for success in the exceptional undertaking that you have assumed on behalf of the entire international community.

The meeting of the Security Council at the level of heads of State and Government convened at the brilliant initiative of the British Government is the clearest demonstration of the common desire to enhance and strengthen the mechanisms that nations have established to ensure international peace and security.

With great confidence in the results of your talks, we hope that the meeting will reaffirm humanity's most cherished values, reiterating that respect for human rights is a basic norm of international coexistence and that commitment to the peaceful settlement of all international disputes is a principle that has received universal acceptance.

May God bless you and guide your deliberations.

(Signed) Carlos S. MENEM

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-sixth session
Agenda item 31
THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA:
THREATS TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE
AND SECURITY AND PEACE
INITIATIVES

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-seventh year

Letter dated 27 January 1992 from the Permanent Representative of El Salvador to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit to you the New York Act (see annex I) and the New York Act II (see annex II) signed at United Nations Headquarters on 31 December 1991 and 13 January 1992 respectively by the Government of El Salvador and the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional.

I should be grateful if you would have this note and its annexes circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 31, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ricardo G. CASTANEDA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

ANNEX I

New York Act

The Government of El Salvador and the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) hereby declare that they have reached definitive agreements which, combined with those previously signed at San José, Mexico City and New York, complete the negotiations on all substantive items of the Caracas Agenda and the New York "Compressed Negotiations". Their implementation will put a final end to the Salvadorian armed conflict.

An agreement has also been reached on all technical and military aspects relating to the separation of the warring parties and the cessation of the armed conflict, which includes the end of the military structure of the FMLN and the reintegration of its members, within a framework of full legality, into the civil, political and institutional life of the country.

The parties have also agreed that the cessation of the armed conflict shall take effect formally on 1 February 1992 and shall conclude on 31 October 1992.

A further meeting between the parties has been scheduled for 5 January 1992 to negotiate the timetable for implementing the agreements and the procedure for ending the military structure of the FMLN and reintegrating its members, within a framework of full legality, into the civil, political and institutional life of the country.

Such negotiations must be successfully concluded by 10 January 1992 at the latest. Otherwise, the parties undertake to accept, by 14 January 1992 at the latest, a formula for resolving outstanding issues to be proposed to them by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The Final Peace Agreements will be signed at Mexico City on 16 January 1992.

The parties undertake to preserve the atmosphere necessary for maintaining and expanding the unilateral decisions which they have taken in order to avoid all military activity.

New York, 31 December 1991

Representing the Government of El Salvador:	Representing the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberacíon Nacional:
(Signed) Mr. Oscar SANTAMARIA	(Signed) Cmdr. Schafik HANDAL
(Signed) Col. Mauricio Ernesto VARGAS	(Signed) Cmdr. Francisco JOVEL
(Signed) Mr. David ESCOBAR GALINDO	(Signed) Cmdr. Salvador SANCHEZ CEREN

(Signed) Col. Juan MARTINEZ VARELA (Signed) Cmdr. Eduardo SANCHO

(Signed) Mr. Abelardo TORRES (Signed) Cmdr. Joaquín VILLALOBOS

(Signed) Mr. Rafael HERNAN CONTRERAS

(Signed) Alvaro DE SOTO
Representative of the Secretary-General
of the United Nations

ANNEX II

New York Act II

The Government of El Salvador and the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional, meeting at United Nations Headquarters, have reached agreements which complete the negotiations on all issues outstanding when the New York Act was signed on 31 December 1991. This opens the way for the signing of the Peace Agreement in Mexico City on 16 January 1992.

New York, 13 January 1992

Representing the Government of El Salvador:	Representing the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional:
(Signed) Mr. Oscar Alfredo SANTAMARIA	(Signed) Cmdr. Schafik HANDAL
(Signed) Mr. David ESCOBAR GALINDO	(Signed) Cmdr. Salvador SANCHEZ CEREN
(Signed) Gen. Mauricio Ernesto VARGAS	(Signed) Cmdr. Eduardo SANCHO
(Signed) Mr. Rafael HERNAN CONTRERAS	(Signed) Ana Guadalupe MARTINEZ
	(Signed) María Marta VALLADARES

(Signed) Alvaro DE SOTO
Representative of the Secretary-General
of the United Nations

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NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the members of the Security Council the attached communication which he has received from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Annex

Letter dated 28 January 1992 from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency addressed to the Secretary-General

Please find attached the report of the ninth IAEA Inspection in Iraq under Security Council resolution 687 (1991). You may deem it appropriate to transmit the report to the members of the Security Council. I remain, of course, available with the Chief Inspector, Professor Maurizio Zifferero for any consultations you or the Council may wish to have.

(Signed) Hans BLIX

Enclosure

REPORT ON THE NINTH IAEA ON-SITE INSPECTION IN IRAQ

UNDER SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 687 (1991)

11 - 14 January 1992

SALIENT POINTS

- The main objective of the ninth IAEA on-site inspection was to verify recent information obtained from Governments of Member States, and in particular from the Government of Germany, about the procurement of large quantities of stock materials and components needed in the manufacturing of gas centrifuge machines for the production of enriched uranium.

  The materials and components in question included purpose-designed aluminium alloy extrusions used in the production of centrifuge vacuum housings and molecular pumps, and ferrite magnets used in the stators of the centrifuge motors. The quantities involved, which would have been sufficient for the manufacture of the basic static parts of several thousand centrifuges, had not been included in any previous Iraqi declaration.

- This information was discussed with the Iraqi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs in the presence of technical experts from both sides. Subsequent to the discussion, the Iraqi authorities acknowledged the procurement of these materials and components, but stated that all had been destroyed or "rendered harmless" by melting and crushing before the beginning of nuclear inspections in Iraq under resolution 687.

- Further, they acknowledged the procurement of 100 tons of the special high-tensile-strength steel (maraging steel) needed for producing several thousand centrifuge rotors and rotor internal fittings and the procurement of a few thousand aluminium forgings for the vacuum housing top and bottom flanges.

  The Iraqi authorities explained that in this case also the stockpile of maraging steel and aluminium forgings had been "rendered harmless" by melting before the start of the nuclear inspections and offered to present to the team all the materials which they had procured at the location where they were currently stored after being rendered harmless.

- The inspection team verified and sampled the melted maraging steel stockpile and the powder resulting from the crushing of the ferrite magnets, leaving for the next inspection the remaining verifications. A rough estimate of the quantities made on-site appears consistent with the quantities procured. Full verification must await the results of sample analyses and a more accurate assessment of mass.

- The results of this inspection have resolved a number of inconsistencies regarding the Iraqi centrifuge programme remaining from previous inspections. In the opinion of the experts who took part in the nuclear inspection, Iraq had not reached the point where it could start centrifuge production on a sizeable scale, but given time, it would have been successful.

- However, the centrifuge enrichment programme had reached the point where the materials necessary for certain key centrifuge components had been identified, and these materials were being procured as opportunities presented themselves even though the final design had not been completely fixed nor the manufacturing process fully implemented. The operation of any production-oriented centrifuge cascade would have required the procurement of large numbers of finished components, but the nuclear inspection teams have found no evidence of this.

- Initiatives taken by the German Government have greatly assisted the ongoing inspection effort as it relates to the Iraqi centrifuge enrichment programme.

INTRODUCTION

1. This report summarizes the findings of the ninth inspection carried out by the IAEA in Iraq under Security Council resolution 687 (1991) with the assistance and co-operation of the Special Commission of the United Nations. The inspection took place from 11 to 14 January 1992 and was headed by Mr. Maurizio Zifferero of the IAEA as Chief Inspector. The team consisted of 6 inspectors and 8 supporting staff; it comprised 8 nationalities.

   The objectives of the inspection were mainly to:

   - verify information, recently received from the German Government, concerning the procurement by Iraq of stock materials and components needed in the manufacturing of gas centrifuges for the production of enriched uranium.

   - visit a few previously inspected sites for follow-up actions in order to verify the existence of some machine-tools which might have been associated with the centrifuge enrichment programme.

2. A meeting was held at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Sunday, 12 January. The Iraqi delegation was headed by Mr. Muhammad Said al-Sahhaf, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, and included Mr. Human al-Ghaffar, the Chairman of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC), Mr. Ibrahim al-Hajjaj, the leader of the Iraqi team for nuclear inspections under resolution 687, and Mr. Abd al-Qadir Ahmad, former Director of the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Centre and now advisor to the IAEC. The Agency's Chief Inspector gave the Minister a copy of the information recently received from the German Government (see Annex 1) concerning the procurement by Iraq of large quantities of stock materials and components, the nature of which left no doubt about their future utilization in the manufacturing of a large number of centrifuges for producing enriched uranium. In the light of this evidence, the Iraqi authorities were invited to come forward with a comprehensive statement about their procurement of stock materials, components and equipment related to their centrifuge programme.

On the following day a technical meeting was held at the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Centre. The Iraqi team acknowledged the procurement of the materials and components indicated by the German Government. They further acknowledged the import of additional stock materials including maraging steel and items described later in this report. The Iraqi authorities explained that the entire stockpile of materials and components had been destroyed or "rendered harmless" by melting and crushing before the beginning of nuclear inspections in Iraq under resolution 687. The inspection team was given the possibility to verify the materials and components at the site to which they had been moved for destruction.

3. A site already inspected during the fourth IAEA mission, in the proximity of the Baghdad North Bridge, was thoroughly re-inspected at the request of the Special Commission. The results of the fourth inspection were confirmed in the sense that no immediate evidence of a connection with nuclear activities was found.

4. At the end of the inspection, the team was given a set of documents including written replies to questions asked during the ninth and previous inspections and a set of tables containing a list of items to be reported by Iraq to the Agency under resolution 715. The list of documents received or transmitted in the course of the inspection is contained in Annex 2.

THE GAS CENTRIFUGE URANIUM ENRICHMENT PROGRAMME

5. The detailed analysis of centrifuge components removed from Iraq during the seventh and eighth inspections and new data on foreign procurements by Iraq (acknowledged and added to by Iraqi authorities during the ninth inspection) have resulted in a more consistent picture of the Iraqi centrifuge programme. The new data on foreign procurements were provided by IAEA Member States working with the Action Team and, in two significant instances, by Iraq.

6. The Iraqi centrifuge design conforms substantially to early west European designs. However, no component is identical in design; all showed evidence of intelligent adaptation and development based on sound principles. A number of capable scientists and engineers were involved in the Iraqi centrifuge development effort, but it is unlikely that they were able to make the observed design modifications without

outside help. The Iraqi authorities acknowledged "advice from abroad", but they were clearly trying to minimize the extent of foreign involvement. A centrifuge constructed from components found in Iraq, but manufactured to a higher quality standard, would have a separative power greater than that declared by Iraq.

7. Investigations of Iraqi procurements, with the close co-operation of Member State Governments, have become an integral part of the overall inspection effort. Among the data obtained is information from the German Government indicating that large quantities of stock materials intended for the Iraqi centrifuge manufacturing programme had been delivered to Iraq during the period January - May 1990. These stock materials included:

- 300 tonnes of aluminium alloy (AlMgSi 1 F31) tube extrusions for the manufacture of vacuum housings (enough for approximately 2,500 housings). An order for an additional 310 tonnes was stopped by the embargo.

- 84 tonnes of aluminium alloy (AlMgSiPb F28) tube extrusions for the manufacture of molecular pumps (enough for 6,000 pumps);

- 240,000 ferrite magnet spacers (24 per centrifuge stator) and 10,000 soft iron ring band cores (providing material for the manufacture of 10,000 stators for centrifuge motors).

During the ninth inspection, the Iraqi authorities confirmed the receipt of these materials and, in addition, declared the procurement of:

- 100 tonnes of 350-grade maraging steel (material sufficient for approximately 5,000 centrifuges employing maraging steel rotors, end caps and baffles);

- Aluminium forgings sufficient for the manufacture of several thousand top and bottom flanges for the centrifuge vacuum housings.

A schematic showing the various centrifuge components referred to above is presented as Figure 1. The estimate of the numbers of centrifuge components that could have been manufactured from the stated amounts of material implies no

FIGURE 1. CENTRIFUGE COMPONENTS



Figure 1

difficulty in meeting the required specifications. A reject rate in the range of 50% for some components was estimated by the Iraqi experts. This reasonably can be expected while the manufacturing process is being implemented.

8. The acquisition of such large quantities of stock materials indicates that Iraq was planning for a much larger and more rapid centrifuge deployment than previously declared. The Iraqi authorities acknowledged this, but argued that there was no contradiction between the very large procurements and the centrifuge development and deployment schedule given to the third and fourth inspection teams; this schedule shows a 500- machine cascade beginning to operate early in 1996. They indicated that the material specifications for important components had been set by mid-1989, but that the final design of the centrifuge was not fixed at the time work stopped because of the Gulf War. Faced with tighter and tighter export controls, they proceeded with the large procurements as opportunities presented themselves, even though they had no immediate plans for the materials in the quantities ordered. Their strategy was to buy whenever there was an opportunity and simply run the risk that some material might not be used.

9. The Iraqi authorities, explaining this material had not been declared, stated that immediately after the Gulf War a political decision had been taken to dismantle and destroy the nuclear programme. In line with this decision, all centrifuge-related materials, equipment and documents were turned over to the Iraqi military for destruction. The actions taken to destroy the materials in question were described as follows:

- The 100 tonnes of 350-grade maraging steel rods and tubes were taken (except for the 3.25 tonnes previously declared to the inspection teams) to the State Establishment for Mechanical Works (a foundry near Iskandariya), melted and poured into "ingots".

- The ferrite magnets and ring band cores were taken to the same establishment. The ferrite magnets were crushed into powder and the ring band cores were melted.

- Aluminium alloys (more than 450 tonnes) in the form of tube extrusions for the manufacture of vacuum housings and molecular pumps and in the form of forgings for the manufacture of end flanges were taken to the Ur Establishment (an aluminium smelter at Al Nassiriya) and melted together.

The Iraqi authorities explained that these materials had been destroyed before the beginning of IAEA inspections, and destroyed in a manner that rendered them useless for centrifuges (e.g. the maraging steel was no longer maraging). Their position was that technically they no longer had maraging steel, special aluminium alloys etc. and, under their interpretation of resolution 687 and later Security Council resolutions, they were not obliged to declare them.

10. Obviously this position can be debated, particularly in view of past Iraqi attempts to hide the true nature and extent of Iraq's nuclear programme. However, justifiable or not, this position suggests that the inspection teams will continue to have difficulty in uncovering and verifying the complete Iraqi programme. The destruction process which began in the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War was, according to the Iraqi authorities, stopped only at the time of the high-level visit by Messrs. Ekéus, Blix and Akashi on 29 June 1991 during the second inspection. The Iraqi statement was that the only centrifuge-related equipment and materials declared by Iraq and verified by inspection teams prior to the ninth inspection were materials and equipment that had not been destroyed as of the end of June 1991. As more procurement data become available, there will probably continue to be mismatches between quantities of materials and equipment delivered to Iraq and quantities declared to and verified by inspection teams. Furthermore, even if the Iraqi position could be accepted, it has not been applied in a consistent manner.

11. The quantities of stock materials were declared by Iraq to be available for inspection at the sites to which they had been taken for destruction. On the last day of the ninth inspection the team went to the State Establishment for Mechanical Works at Iskandariya in order to inspect the melt of the maraging steel and ferrite magnet powder. The team was shown a large pile of flat, irregularly shaped "ingots" in an outside storage area. Samples were taken for the purpose of confirming that the chemical composition is that of maraging steel and that the melting has indeed rendered the material useless for centrifuges. One ingot was selected at random and

weighed (740 kg). This together with a rough count of the number of ingots led to an estimate of the total mass that is reasonably consistent with the Iraqi declaration. Pending confirmation of the chemical composition of the material at Iskandariya, it now appears that the 100 tonnes of maraging steel is generally accounted for - i.e. i) the 1.5 tonnes of maraging steel centrifuge components (end caps and baffles) stopped en route from Switzerland to Iraq at Frankfurt Airport, ii) the maraging steel components declared and inspected at the Ash Shakyli warehouse near Al Tuwaitha and iii) the material seen by the ninth inspection team at Iskandariya. The team was also shown a steel box containing approximately 100 litres of a ceramic powder which, according to the Iraqi authorities, was all that remained of the ferrite magnets; samples were taken to confirm this. More precise assessment of the material stored at Iskandariya and examination of the aluminium melted at Al Nassiriya will be on the agenda of the next inspection.

12. The official Iraqi declaration regarding the number of carbon fibre rotors had been revised upwards from 10 to 20. Twelve of the rotors were seen by inspectors - five were removed from Iraq for analysis and 7 were destroyed during the seventh inspection. Iraq claims that 8 carbon rotors were broken during attempts to install end caps. This is plausible, as an independent assessment of centrifuge components removed from Iraq came to the conclusion that the maraging steel end caps were over-sized vis-a-vis the carbon rotors. The source of the carbon rotors remains unknown. Analysis of them has identified the company which produced the carbon filaments. However, it has been determined that this company has only had one customer for the particular grades of carbon fibre in question and that the customer was not Iraq. Further, the construction of the helix layer is different between at least two of the rotors removed from Iraq and different still from the construction used in Europe. The Iraqi authorities stated that they had procured 20 rotors from a "dealer" and that they had had nothing to do with material and construction specifications. They had chosen to purchase the carbon rotors to support the mechanical endurance and separation testing of single machines as they worked to install the maraging steel rotor line. Immediately before the ninth inspection, the Action Team received a report that three filament winding machines had been delivered to Iraq. The Special Commission indicated that a missile inspection team had seen filament winding machines at the Dhu Al Fiqar factory near Falluja. These machines were inspected. There are three filament winding machines at this location, but expert opinion is that they do not possess sufficient capability for the manufacture of carbon fibre rotors.

As usual, manufacture-related information had been removed from the machines. Action to ascertain whether the machines seen at Dhu Al Fiqar correspond to those reported to have been delivered to Iraq will be taken.

13. The Iraqi plans for the installation of centrifuge manufacturing equipment at Al Furat apparently included five CNC machines in addition to the equipment identified in the seventh and eighth inspection reports. Evidence available to the IAEA inspection team indicates that these five machines were being procured for the manufacture of maraging steel end caps and baffles. The procurement included the demonstration by the manufacturer that the machines were capable of producing the maraging steel pieces to the required specifications. Iraq supplied the manufacturer with maraging steel (presumably from the stock of 100 tonnes described earlier). The return shipment to Iraq of the finished demonstration pieces was intercepted and stopped by German authorities at Frankfurt airport. The full Iraqi order to the European manufacturer was for 15 CNC machines. The five machines referred to above were never delivered. The ten machines that were delivered are, according to Iraqi statements, the machines currently under IAEA seal at the Badr State Establishment. These machines show little signs of use and the analysis of metal turnings taken from some of these machines does not provide evidence that they were used for the manufacture of centrifuge components. It has not been confirmed that the ten machines at Badr are the ten machines originally ordered for the centrifuge programme.

14. Further analysis of the maraging steel rotors, mandrel collar and flow-forming rollers supports Iraqi declarations regarding the extent of use of the flow-forming machine. One of the flow-forming rollers rendered harmless during the eighth mission was removed from Iraq by the ninth team in order to confirm a correspondence between the rollers and the maraging steel rotors. The ninth team also inspected nine flow-forming machines declared by Iraq to have been used in the production of 122-mm and 262-mm rocket bodies. Seven of these machines are installed at the Nasr Establishment at Taji and two are being stored at a subsidiary establishment at Schäula. Eight of the machines are identical, and capable of flow-forming diameters in the range 60-400 mm. The ninth machine (at Schäula) is much larger, and is capable of flow-forming diameters in the range 80-600 mm. All mandrels and other fixtures observed are consistent with Iraqi statements. If the machines were fitted with the appropriate mandrels, rollers, etc., then all machines inspected could have been

used to produce steel centrifuge rotors. The Iraqi authorities reiterated that they had only one mandrel for centrifuge rotors. Most of the machines suffered substantial damage during the Gulf War.

15. The additional five CNC machines referred to in para. 13 above, which are now stated to have been intended for installation at Al Furat, provides a larger potential production capacity than originally estimated by experts. The layout of the Al Furat complex with the planned utilization (as identified by Iraq) is described in Figure 2. The buildings designated as B01, B02 and B03 were far from completion when work stopped.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

16. The ninth inspection team conducted a short-notice inspection of the Rashdiya complex, located in the proximity of Baghdad North Bridge. The complex had been designated and inspected by the fourth inspection team. It was constructed in the early 1980s as a project of the Ministry of Agriculture for research and development in water irrigation technology. According to supplied information, the research for which the facility was designed was terminated for lack of success and the entire complex was taken over in 1988 by the Ministry of Industry and Minerals. They partitioned the facility and established an "Engineering Design Centre" (occupying what had been the administration and R & D buildings) in the northern part of the site and were attempting to establish a paper mill/vocational training centre (under the auspices of the Department of Forestry) in the southern portion. The site was physically divided by a wall, the only connection between the two parts being through the main entrances set at two points along the west side of the complex.

17. The Engineering Design Centre was stated to have a staff of 250 technical and administrative personnel. Their work was described as having generally to do with water treatment and water quality, but since the end of the Gulf War most of the staff have been assigned to projects associated with the reconstruction effort. Most offices and laboratories were empty and showed no signs of recent occupancy. The few laboratories where there was activity seemed to be involved in work consistent with Iraqi statements. One typical feature was the complete absence of paper records or reports. The Director of the Centre was unable to produce a single piece of paper related to its projects. His explanation was that all records and reports were

FIGURE 2. THE AL FURAT CENTRIFUGE PRODUCTION COMPLEX



Figure 2

.../

maintained at the field locations where the staff were working or at the Ministry. The Director repeatedly stated that the Centre had never performed any nuclear-related work and that he and his staff had no knowledge of the Petrochemical-3 (PC-3) project.

18. In the southern part of the complex, there are a large main building, settling tanks, a water pump house and three buildings in the early stages of construction. The southernmost area is occupied by a deserted construction camp. The main building has a huge, high-bay hall (approximately 6,000 m^2) and a suite of offices along the eastern side. The building is being used to store fertilizers, pesticides and seeds. At the time of the inspection, about 10% of the floor area was being used for this purpose. The rest was empty. The facility has a staff of 3-4 people, who essentially serve as caretakers. It was explained that the main building and the three under construction were intended to be used for wood/paper products R & D and a vocational training centre. Blueprints for the buildings under construction found in a deserted office have titles that appear to confirm this. Construction work stopped at the onset of the Gulf War. At one time, the main building was connected to the R & D building by a first-floor walkway, which has since been walled off. The building has a huge water supply, which Iraqi statements linked to the defunct hydrology project. The north-west corner of the building contains a small room (100 m^2) which had been freshly painted and which had a new concrete floor. The manager's explanation was that this room was being prepared for the storage of herbicides that needed to be kept separate from the materials stored in the main hall. There was no physical evidence or other signs of recent modifications which might suggest that this facility served some other purpose than what was declared. A large number of samples were taken.

Appendix I

Letter dated 17 January 1992 from the Alternate to the Resident Representative of Germany to the Office of the United Nations and to the other International Organizations, Vienna, addressed to the Leader of the IAEA Action Team Iraq, established pursuant to Security Council resolution 687 (1991)

With reference to the Action Team's findings on the Iraq centrifuge programme as contained in the reports on the 6th and 7th IAEA on-site inspection, my Government has authorized me to make the following additional information on supplies from Germany to Iraq for the centrifuge programme available to you:

240.000 ferrite shaped parts for centrifuge stators and 10.000 pieces of ring sheet material were supplied, in several shipments, to the State Electrical Industries Establishment, Baghdad between January and May 1990, by a German company. A die-casting machine for the manufacture of coil rings for stators was also supplied.

The volume of these supplies may allow some conclusion on the scope and size of the Iraqi centrifuge programme.

Supplementary documentation and drawings are available for examination by experts of the special commission and the IAEA Action Team at the Federal Foreign Office in Bonn, Germany.

(Signed) Klaus UNGER
Alternate to the Resident Representative

Appendix II

List of documents received or transmitted during the Ninth Inspection

920113	Letter from Maurizio Zifferero to Al Hajjaj requesting information on German exports in the centrifuge project.
920114	Letter from Al Hajjaj to Maurizio Zifferero giving information on German procurement on centrifuges.
920114	Letter from Al Hajjaj to Maurizio Zifferero giving details on the request of radiopharmaceuticals.
920114	Letter from Al Hajjaj to Dimitri Perricos giving information on the movements of IAEC personnel to the "new site" of Al Atheer.
920114	Letter from Al Hajjaj to Dimitri Perricos addressing questions raised in writing on 911116 and 911118 on i) staff and equipment transfer to Al-Atheer from Tuwaitha and ii) clarifications regarding activities of Group 4 of PC-3.
920114	Long table of items as requested in Annex 3 of the long term monitoring plan to complete earlier submission and revised list of radioactive sources. They will provide also an English version and transmit it officially to the UNSG and Dr. Blix.

UNITED
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Security Council

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S/23506
2 February 1992
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: SPANISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 31 JANUARY 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ARGENTINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Mission of the Argentine Republic to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and, with reference to his notes SCPC/8/91(1) and SCPC/8/92(1) relating to Security Council resolution 724 (1992), herewith annexes a copy of Decree No. 217 by the National Executive of the Argentine Republic, dated 28 January 1992.

The Permanent Mission of the Argentine Republic requests the Secretariat kindly to distribute this note and its annex as a document of the Security Council.

The Permanent Mission of the Argentine Republic to the United Nations takes this opportunity to convey to the Secretary-General of the United Nations the renewed assurances of its highest consideration.

Annex

Buenos Aires, 28 January 1992

IN VIEW OF THE FACT that the Argentine Republic is a founding member of the United Nations, whose Charter was adopted by Decree No. 21.195/46 and Act No. 12.838 and ratified on 24 September 1946, and

CONSIDERING:

That the United Nations Security Council is the organ competent to decide on measures required for the maintenance of international peace and security, in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter,

That, in the exercise of such power, the Security Council on 26 September 1991 adopted resolution 713 (1991) concerning the situation in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, by which it was decided that a general and complete embargo should be immediately implemented on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia,

That the Members of the United Nations must accept and comply with the decisions of the Security Council, assisting it in any action taken by it in conformity with the Charter,

That on 8 August of the current year, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship issued a communiqué stating that, under the policies in force, weapons were not being and would not be exported to areas in conflict,

That since 1985 a Commission to Coordinate War Matériel Export Policy has been operating in Argentina, composed of officials from the Ministry of the Economy and Public Works and Services, the Ministry of Defence, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship, who are required to take action in advance of the initiation of any negotiation on the export of such matériel,

That the present measure is being promulgated under the powers conferred by article 86, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the National Constitution.

Accordingly,

THE PRESIDENT OF THE ARGENTINE NATION

DECREES:

ARTICLE 1. The attached resolution 713 (1991) adopted by the United Nations Security Council on 25 September 1991, is adopted.

ARTICLE 2. The National Executive and the branches and public agencies of the State shall, in their respective jurisdictions, take all appropriate measures

to implement the decision contained in the resolution adopted in the preceding article.

ARTICLE 3. The Ministry of Defence shall communicate the present decree to the Commission to Coordinate War Matériel Export Policy.

ARTICLE 4. The present decree shall be communicated, published, and deposited with the National Official Registry Department and shall be entered into the archives.

DECREE NO. 217

Legal and Technical Secretariat of
the Office of the President of Argentina

(Signed) (illegible)

(Signed) José Luis MANZANO
Minister of the Interior

(Signed) Guido di TELLA
Minister for Foreign Affairs
and Worship

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

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S/23507
3 February 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 30 JANUARY 1992 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF SOMALIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Pursuant to my letter of 20 January 1992 (S/23445), I should like to express, at the outset, my gratitude to you and the members of the Security Council for your decision to consider the problem of the worsening political and security situation in my country. I wish to express my deep gratification with the unanimous adoption by the Council of resolution 733 (1992) whose recommendations I highly appreciate. I sincerely hope that it will have the intended effect of diminishing human suffering, a holding cease-fire, an effective national reconciliation and lasting peace in my country. In this spirit, I feel encouraged, indeed obliged, to present to you the following paragraphs in an attempt to highlight the material facts of the situation, as I see them today, with a view to enabling the Council to reach in their light, a final approach to the problem. I would therefore be grateful if the attached document were circulated in its entirety as a document of the Security Council.

I sincerely hope that you and the Council will find this document both informative and constructive. I have tried to the best of my ability to be objective although, as a Somali, I am emotionally affected - and ashamed - by what is happening in my country. My sole purpose in submitting the document is to help my country and my people of all clans and factions.

(Signed) Fatun Mohammed HASSAN
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

Annex

Approaches to the problems of Somalia

Ever since the last thread of central authority in Somalia was broken one full year ago by the onslaught of the United Somali Congress (USC) on the national capital, Mogadishu, anarchy has reigned and the long national strife against President Mohammed Siad Barre and his regime was transformed overnight into an internecine inter-clan struggle for power and supremacy. The reasons for this are not difficult to understand: first, all those groups (whatever they may call themselves, USC, SPM, SSDF, etc.) who were fighting to overthrow the Barre regime were, as they still are today, purely clan-based; secondly, they were remotely united only in their ephemeral purpose of bringing to an end the long rule of an unpopular regime, and that semblance of unity disappeared with the disappearance of that regime; thirdly, their respective aspirations were, like their respective composition, tribal rather than national; fourthly, there were hardly any neutral elements in the country itself to mediate in order to bring these bloody conflicts to a quick end; finally, the eyes of the international community were focused elsewhere and my poor countrymen were left to their own devices. Sadly, however, they did not have any devices of their own except self-destruction.

I am not going to dwell on the barbarous atrocities which my countrymen in Mogadishu have so senselessly been perpetrating on each other. The grisly details of those atrocities in our hapless national capital have been graphically presented in the mass media by news correspondents. But the situation in the national capital has given a totally erroneous picture of the country as a whole; for the fact is that, although in Mogadishu the faculty of emotion has prevailed over and suppressed that of reason in the heat of the fighting, the people in other regions of Somalia have actually organized themselves under the banner of their own respective political factions and have formed ad hoc regional administrations with responsibilities for maintaining law and order, providing essential though minimum services, and regulating economic activities. Few of us know that these regional administrations exist; that schools and hospitals (although ill-provided for) are open; and that even one newspaper at least is published in every major provincial city. All these have been eclipsed by the chaos in Mogadishu which is perpetuating a human tragedy of massive proportions. This does not mean that there are no breaches of the peace in the regions outside Mogadishu. There have certainly been incidents and occasional violent outbursts between sections of even the same sub-clan; there has been some fighting recently, for example, in Berbera, Burao, Bossasso, Erigavo, and Kismayo and there have been violent incidents which have caused the death of aid workers and United Nations staff. That is so because the regional administrations are weak in terms of resources and do not monopolize the possession of weapons which would enable them to maintain order.

The overall situation is not therefore totally hopeless as painted in the various reports and it would be wrong on the part of the international

community to hold the entire Somali nation hostage to the whims of two opposing wings of a faction which are playing havoc in Mogadishu with the lives of defenceless women and children. I submit to the Council, that a solution to my country's tragedy, albeit a difficult undertaking, is not so elusive as some of us might think but is in fact within reach of the international community. However, before we explore further, the best possible solution to a seemingly impossible situation, I should like to share with you my own assessment of the current realities of the situation.

I have already mentioned that the tragic events in Mogadishu do not mirror what is happening in the rest of the country. The distinction between the two situations is useful to any approach to the problems. It is vitally important that the Council realize that all political entities in Somalia are the clans themselves and such deceptive labels as USC, SSDF, SPM, SNM, etc., are only masks designed to give a modern face to clan politics. Consequently, each of these groups is controlling only the geographic area which is the traditional home of its clan. Hence, the absence of any national or even inter-clan political organization which can legitimately claim to have the right to form a national government. For example, the USC considers Mogadishu to be its own, lock, stock and barrel for the mere reason that it lies within the clan's territorial boundary. They have, as a result, driven out everybody else. So, those others who wish to return to Mogadishu when all is done and the dust has settled must do so as guests, and only on USC terms.

Despite the fact that Somalia is torn to pieces by the current civil strife, the underlying reality is that the Somalis are one indivisible people sharing one language, one religion, one culture and a very high degree of racial homogeneity. The war does not make them less homogeneous than they were before. Furthermore, no clan has ever denied its being Somali and all political factions despite their differences are still using the word "Somali" as an integral part of their respective appellations; for example, Somali National Movement (SNM), United Somali Congress (USC), Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) and so on. The SNM has declared the secession of the five northern regions in spite of the fact that it draws its support exclusively from two of these regions. That decision was, as admitted by the SNM itself, made on the spur of the moment and only on the basis of the popular clamour of the people of Burao. But it runs counter to SNM's previously declared policy of keeping national unity, and there was no referendum of any kind. Any fissiparous tendency can also be remedied in the context of establishing good and responsible government for the whole of Somalia which will, through devolution, give all the clans a sense of belonging. The Somali nation cannot simply be artificially partitioned along the lines of erstwhile colonial boundaries which served only the interests of metropolitan powers, and the respective ill-feelings of Somalis towards one another cannot alter the basic fact of their consanguinity. Keeping our nation intact is a duty we owe to posterity and we shall not waiver in that duty.

Allow me now to move on to the more difficult area of solutions. There are those who contend, not without justification I am afraid, that Somalia was

neglected by the powerful members of the international community because it had lost its strategic value as a result of changes in the arena of international politics, or because of its being African. I would like to believe that the Security Council is motivated more by its concern for human life and dignity than by the selfish political and strategic interests of its members. But, whatever the reasons may be, the fact remains that my country has not been fortunate enough to receive any international political assistance to end its protracted crisis. And whatever medical and relief assistance that was given to the country was ineffective partly because the security situation did not permit optimal distribution, partly because it was concentrated in few areas and partly because it represented but a trifle of the total requirements of the disaffected population. We are, nevertheless, very, very grateful for those who supplied the assistance as well as those who endangered their own lives to help our people.

The effectiveness of any relief or medical assistance is, by and large, contingent upon finding a viable solution to the political problems which are manifesting themselves as security problems. It is my considered view that a two-pronged approach be adopted. On the one hand every effort should be made to ensure that there is a holding cease-fire which, if necessary, should be maintained by coercive means. On the other hand, a national reconciliation conference should be arranged under the auspices of the Security Council. It is absolutely imperative that the United Nations should throw its considerable weight and prestige behind efforts towards that conference, bearing in mind that the Arab League and individual Governments which are friends of Somalia, but are more resourceful than the Organization of African Unity (OAU), have tried several times without avail. However, such a conference should avoid the pitfalls of the previous Somali National Reconciliation Conference which was held in Djibouti in July 1991. That conference failed mainly because it was not truly representative and because of deep internal divisions within the USC which had taken over the capital city. As to the declared secession of the SNM, the most obvious thing to do is to reinforce the positions of the OAU, the Arab League and the Organization of the Islamic Conference in condemning it in no uncertain terms and thereby uphold the unity of the Somali nation. Any separatist group must, in addition, face the threat of sanctions. If this is done, and a government of national unity is formed, I am sure the SNM will sooner than later see the wisdom of joining hands with their brothers and sisters.

However, there are two essential prerequisites that should be fulfilled if the approach along the lines I have humbly indicated is to succeed. The first is to overcome the barrier of communication between the different factions. Granted that they are not on speaking terms at present, but the fact that they are all tired of this interminable situation augurs well for concerted and unrelenting international efforts to bring them together. The second is that there must be a strong will on the part of the international community to exert and maintain pressure on any party which refuses reconciliation.

In conclusion, let me assure the Council that any measures - even if coercive - to resolve the current crisis in Somalia cannot and will not be interpreted as interference in our internal affairs since their effect will be the saving of human lives and the restoration of human dignity. The situation cries out for the help of the United Nations and particularly the Security Council. The Somali people are bewildered by what they see as the callous indifference of the international community, but their eyes are nevertheless focused on the United Nations. They are pleading with you to stop the bleeding of their country. Please help by acting now.

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Security Council

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S/23507/Corr.1
6 February 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 30 JANUARY 1992 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I.
OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF SOMALIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Corrigendum

1. Annex, page 4, last paragraph

The paragraph should read:

However, there are three essential prerequisites that should be fulfilled if any option along the lines I have humbly indicated is to succeed. The first is to ensure that all entities or factions as defined by an acronym or any other name (whether representative of a clan, a geographical boundary or any other form of grouping) should be identified with a view to all of them gaining the recognition of one another, which will facilitate an assembly of the whole nation. To my knowledge, there are so far USC, SSDF, SPM, SNF and SDM, which draw their support from the southern parts of the country, and there are SNM, SDA, USP and USF, which draw their support from the northern regions. The second is to overcome the barriers of communication between the different factions. Granted that they are not on speaking terms at present, but the fact that they are all tired of this interminable situation augurs well for a concerted effort to bring them together. The third is that there must be a strong will on the part of the international community to exert and maintain pressure on any party that refuses reconciliation and to remove any one who persists in being an obstacle to peace.

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Security Council

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S/23508
3 February 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCERNING THE CREDENTIALS OF THE ALTERNATE REPRESENTATIVE OF ZIMBABWE ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a letter dated 3 February 1992 from the Permanent Representative of Zimbabwe to the United Nations stating that Mr. Winston T. Msengezi has been appointed alternate representative of Zimbabwe on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, this letter constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

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Security Council

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S/23509
3 February 1992
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: SPANISH

LETTER DATED 3 FEBRUARY 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF MEXICO TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I enclose the statement issued by the Mexican Government on the occasion of the summit meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992.

I should be grateful if you would issue the above-mentioned statement as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Jorge MONTAÑO
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Mexico
to the United Nations

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Annex

Statement concerning the summit meeting of the Security Council

With reference to the summit meeting of the Security Council of the United Nations to be held at the Headquarters of the Organization on 31 January 1992, the Mexican Government wishes to state the following:

1. Mexico takes note that the Russian Federation has taken the place of the former Soviet Union as a State Member of the United Nations and that, in that capacity, it has taken over the corresponding seat on the Security Council.

2. In the light of the profound changes which have occurred on the international stage in recent years, Mexico reaffirms the need to adapt the working methods of the Organization in order to make it more democratic and efficient in discharging its tasks. The United Nations must be revitalized by strengthening the mandates of the Secretary-General and the General Assembly.

3. At the same time, consideration must be given to democratizing the Council itself, which should be representative of the interests of the whole international community. The meeting of the Security Council at the highest political level affords an opportunity to initiate a process of reflection and dialogue on the Council's role in international political affairs.

4. Given the growing demands placed on it by new tasks, particularly in the fields of preventive diplomacy and of peacemaking and peace-keeping activities, the Security Council must enjoy universal legitimacy and support. To that end, its composition must reflect the interests and aspirations of all countries and groups of countries, its decisions must be transparent and it must act at all times with due regard for the sovereign rights of States.

5. The dialogue between the Security Council and the General Assembly must be strengthened to enable the latter to make full use of its powers so as to permit the prompt and timely adoption by it of positions regarding situations liable to jeopardize international peace and security.

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General Assembly Security Council

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S/23510
3 February 1992

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-sixth session
Agenda item 31
THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA:
THREATS TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE
AND SECURITY AND PEACE INITIATIVES

Letter dated 3 February 1992 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit to you the statement dated 31 January 1992 of the spokesman of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea concerning the cease-fire agreement in El Salvador (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 31, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) PAK Gil Yon
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

ANNEX

Statement dated 31 January 1992 of the spokesman of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

The cease-fire will come into effect in El Salvador on 1 February, according to the cease-fire agreement to end the civil war of 12 years signed between the Salvadoran Government and the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front on 16 January.

The enforcement of the cease-fire in El Salvador is a valuable result of the tireless efforts of the people of El Salvador to solve peacefully the disputes of the country.

Noting that the cease-fire will mark a good occasion in paving the way of national reconstruction by promoting national reconciliation and ensuring peace in El Salvador, we welcome it.

The cease-fire in El Salvador will contribute to the preservation of peace and stability in Central America.

We highly appreciate the efforts of Latin American countries, including Mexico, which made a contribution to the signing of the cease-fire agreement in El Salvador.

The Korean people sincerely hope the Salvadoran people will achieve reconciliation and unity in accordance with the cease-fire agreement and thus attain common prosperity of the nation.

We hope the cease-fire agreement will be implemented in favour of the interests of the signatories.

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S/23511
4 February 1992

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REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBERS CONCERNING THE APPLICATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA FOR ADMISSION TO MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS

1. At the 3045th meeting on 29 January 1992, the Security Council had before it the application of the Republic of Moldova (S/23468) for admission to membership in the United Nations. In accordance with rule 59 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council and in the absence of a proposal to the contrary, the President of the Council referred the application to the Committee on the Admission of New Members for examination and report.

2. At its 83rd meeting on 4 February 1992, the Committee considered the application of the Republic of Moldova and unanimously decided to recommend to the Security Council that the Republic of Moldova should be admitted to membership in the United Nations.

3. The Committee further decided to recommend to the Security Council that it should have recourse to the provision of the last paragraph of rule 60 of its provisional rules of procedure.

4. Accordingly, the Committee recommends to the Security Council the adoption of the following draft resolution:

The Security Council,

Having examined the application of the Republic of Moldova for admission to the United Nations (S/23468),

Recommends to the General Assembly that the Republic of Moldova be admitted to membership in the United Nations.

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5 February 1992

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-seventh session
REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL
QUESTION OF PALESTINE
POLICIES OF APARTHEID OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA
REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE STRENGTHENING OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION
REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
PROTECTION OF GLOBAL CLIMATE FOR PRESENT AND FUTURE GENERATIONS OF MANKIND
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION FOR THE ERADICATION OF POVERTY IN DEVELOPING COUNTREIS
EXTERNAL DEBT CRISIS AND DEVELOPMENT
ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN
NARCOTIC DRUGS
HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTIONS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-seventh year

Letter dated 30 January 1992 from the Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of the Colombo Declaration issued at the Sixth Meeting of the Heads of State or Government of the member countries of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), held at Colombo, Sri Lanka, on 21 December 1991 (see annex).

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex is circulated as an official document of the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly, under the items entitled "Report of the Economic and Social Council", "Question of Palestine", "Policies of apartheid of the Government of

South Africa", "Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security", "Development and international economic cooperation", "Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development", "Protection of global climate for present and future generations of mankind", "International cooperation for the eradication of poverty in developing countries", "External debt crisis and development", "Advancement of women", "Narcotic drugs" and "Human rights questions", and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Stanley KALPAGE
Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka
to the United Nations

ANNEX

COLOMBO DECLARATION

The Colombo Declaration of the Heads of State or Government of the Member Countries of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation issued on 21st December 1991

INTRODUCTION

1. The Prime Minister of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Her Excellency Begum Khaleda Zia; the King of Bhutan, His Majesty King Jigme Singye Wangchuck; the Prime Minister of the Republic of India, His Excellency Shri Narasimha Rao; the President of the Republic of Maldives, His Excellency Mr Maumoon Abdul Gayoom; the Prime Minister of Nepal, the Rt. Hon. Girija Prasad Koirala; the Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, His Excellency Mian Mohammed Nawaz Sharif and the President of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, His Excellency Ranasinghe Premadasa met at the Sixth Summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) at Colombo, Sri Lanka on 21st December, 1991.

REGIONAL COOPERATION

2. The Heads of State or Government reaffirmed their commitment to the principles and objectives enshrined in the Charter of SAARC. They resolved to promote regional cooperation for the benefit of their people, in a spirit of mutual accommodation, with full respect for the principles of sovereign equality, independence and territorial integrity of all States and in strict adherence to the principles of non-use of force, the peaceful settlement of disputes and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. They also reiterated their commitment to the principles of the United Nations Charter and the Non- aligned Movement.

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ISSUES

3. The Heads of State or Government emphasised the vital importance of assessing the nature and extent of international economic inter-dependence and of the need for reviving the North/South dialogue. They noted the recent developments that had radically transformed the international development relationship deeply affecting the prospects for the economies of the seven SAARC countries. The Heads of State or

Government emphasised the need for vigorously promoting South-South economic cooperation to off-set the negative consequences of international economic developments.

4. The Heads of State or Government also exchanged views on the priorities of their respective national economies. They identified, for the further development of their economies, the importance of securing less restrictive trading and marketing opportunities for their products, more extensive technology and resource transfers to South Asia, debt relief and access on favourable and on more concessional terms to resources from multilateral financial institutions. They agreed to keep an open dialogue on these aspects through mutual consultations.

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

5. The Heads of State or Government assessed current international developments in the political sphere particularly those that affected the lives of the people of South Asia. They noted the changing power structures in international relations and the reduction of confrontations and tensions, particularly among the Super Powers. These have contributed to the receding of the threat of nuclear confrontation and to agreements on disarmament measures. The Heads of State or Government hoped that these developments would restrain the pursuit of military power in all areas of the world. They expressed the hope that the peace dividend would be used for promoting further development of developing countries. They welcomed the trend towards popularly based democratic governments in different parts of the world including in South Asia.

6. The Heads of State or Government observed however that some political issues in particular the Palestine question, the final elimination of Apartheid as well as other problems remained unresolved despite efforts towards their settlement.

7. In regard to human rights, the Heads of State or Government observed that civil and political rights on the one hand and economic and social rights on the other are inter-dependent and of equal importance. Human rights issues should not therefore be viewed in narrow and exclusively political terms. In this context they underlined the need to view the efforts of States to guarantee human rights in their full context, through the pursuit of development for all citizens in conditions of stability, which in turn guarantees the enjoyment of human rights of all persons.

8. The Heads of State or Government while reaffirming their commitment to democracy, human rights and the rule of law, emphasised the need to ensure that development remains at the centre of international attention.

9. The Heads of State or Government agreed to participate in the on-going process of revitalising the United Nations as an effective universal instrument for addressing international issues on an equitable and democratic basis, taking full account of the interests and concerns of all states, including those in South Asia. Issues such as the protection and preservation of the environment and the equitable and sustainable management of global resources, economic development and the alleviation of poverty, the suppression of terrorism, drug trafficking and other international crimes required global responses and solutions calling for action by all states.

PROJECTION OF COLLECTIVE POSITIONS

10. In the context of the SAARC Charter-objective to strengthen cooperation among member-states in international fora, the Heads of State or Government resolved to encourage consultations among delegations of SAARC countries at all international fora and to promote articulation of joint positions where such action would be in the interests of all. They felt that the development of a collective position in international fora would accord them greater credibility and enhance the international profile of South Asia.

STRENGTHENING OF SAARC

11. The Heads of State or Government welcomed the Report presented by the Chairman of the Fifth SAARC Summit, the President of Maldives, and the Head of Government of Bangladesh on the adoption of a more businesslike and functional approach in the conduct of SAARC meetings, as well as the Report submitted by the Chairman of the Ninth Session of the Council of Ministers, the Foreign Minister of Maldives, on rationalizing SAARC activities. The Heads of State or Government also considered other proposals submitted by Member-States and by the Secretariat to make the Association a more effective instrument for the realisation of the aspirations of the people of South Asia.

12. They decided that the Standing Committee should meet in special session in Colombo in April 1992 in order to collate and study all proposals and comments in this respect and to submit a report with its recommendations to the Eleventh Session of the Council of Ministers.

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

13. The Heads of State or Government re-emphasised that regional self-reliance should be resolutely promoted through closer cooperation among countries of the Association and that this would help mitigate the adverse consequences of negative international developments operating against them.

14. The Heads of State or Government requested the Standing Committee at its Special Session to study the question of cooperation between SAARC and appropriate international and regional organizations taking into account the evolution of SAARC activities in the core economic areas and to report to the Eleventh Session of the Council of Ministers.

INTEGRATED PROGRAMME OF ACTION

15. The Heads of State or Government noted the progress made by the Integrated Programme of Action (IPA) in expanding to cover a number of sectors crucial for the economic and social progress of the peoples of South Asia. They were of the view that the challenge facing the IPA was to achieve its identified targets within specific time periods. The Heads of State or Government welcomed the proposals made and the discussions proceeding in SAARC to heighten the effectiveness of the IPA.

POVERTY ALLEVIATION

16. The Heads of State or Government accorded the highest priority to the alleviation of poverty in all South Asian countries. They affirmed that South Asia's poor could constitute a huge and potential resource, provided their basic needs were met, and they were mobilized to create economic growth. This requires that the poor are empowered and are irreversibly linked to the mainstream of development. It was noted that each South Asian country has had significant success cases of this approach to poverty alleviation.

17. Recognising that a great majority of these people remain below the poverty line, they evinced keen interest in a "Daal-Bhaat", or assured nutritional standards approach towards the satisfaction of basic needs of the South Asian poor.

18. Deeply conscious that primary education is the cutting edge in the struggle against poverty and the promotion of development, the Heads of State or Government reaffirmed the importance of attaining the target of providing primary education to all children between the ages of 6 - 14 years by the year 2000. They agreed to share their respective experiences and technical expertise to achieve this goal.

19. The Heads of State or Government decided to establish an independent South Asian Commission on Poverty Alleviation consisting of eminent persons from each SAARC member state to conduct an in-depth study of diverse experiences of the seven countries on poverty alleviation, and to report to the Seventh Summit, their recommendations on the alleviation of poverty in South Asia.

TRADE MANUFACTURES AND SERVICES

20. The Heads of State or Government were pleased to note the establishment of the Committee for Economic Cooperation as an important outcome of the Regional Study on Trade Manufactures and Services. They declared their commitment to the liberalisation of trade in the region through a step by step approach in such a manner that all countries in the region share the benefits of trade expansion equitably.

21. The Heads of State or Government approved that the Inter Governmental Group (IGG) set up on the recommendation of the Committee on Economic Cooperation should formulate and seek agreement on an institutional framework under which specific measures for trade liberalisation among SAARC member-states could be furthered. It should also examine the Sri Lankan proposal to establish a SAARC Preferential Trade Arrangement (SAPTA) by 1997. They directed that the IGG should meet as early as possible and report to the Committee on Economic Cooperation. The Heads of State or Government accepted the offer of the Government of Sri Lanka to host the Second Meeting of the Committee on Economic Cooperation at Colombo in June/July 1992 at which the report of the Inter Governmental Group would be considered.

ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES

22. The Heads of State or Government recognised that the degradation of the environment has emerged as a major global concern. While the protection of the environment is a common imperative for all humankind, the main responsibility in this regard rests on developed countries since most of the emission of pollutants originates in those countries and since they also have greater capacity for taking or facilitating corrective measures.

23. The Heads of State or Government called on the international community to address the question of unsustainable production and consumption patterns and life-styles which lead to environmental degradation. They were also of the view that environmental standards applicable to developed countries may have excessive and unwarranted economic or social costs if applied in developing countries.

24. Adequate new and additional resources are needed for developing countries to pursue an environmentally sensitive process of development that will banish the underlying causes of environmental degradation - poverty, malnutrition and unemployment. Such resources should be transferred to developing countries on an assured basis together with environmentally sound technology at preferential and concessional terms.

25. The Heads of State or Government expressed their conviction that the framework could be laid for an equitable global partnership of all countries with a view to safeguarding the environment.

26. The Heads of State or Government noted that in preparation for the SAARC Year of the Environment, SAARC countries had taken various national as well as regional measures for the preservation of the environment.

27. The Heads of State or Government expressed their satisfaction at the completion of Regional Study on the Causes and Consequences of Natural Disasters and the Protection and Preservation of Environment. They urged the member countries to promote cooperation amongst themselves for enhancing their respective disaster management capabilities and for undertaking specific work-programmes for protection and preser-

vation of the environment. They endorsed the decision of the Council of Ministers to establish a Committee on Environment to :

- examine the recommendations of the Regional Study
- identify measures for immediate action
- decide on modalities for their implementation,

and welcomed the offer of Bangladesh to hold the first meeting of the Committee in Dhaka.

28. The Heads of State or Government noted with satisfaction the decision of the Standing Committee concerning the time frame to finalise the regional study on the " 'Greenhouse Effect' and its Impact on the Region". They urged member countries to consult each other on key issues concerning climate change, Bio-diversity and Biotechnology, a global consensus on forestry principles, transfer of environmentally sound technology, management of waste and other issues for discussion at Inter-governmental Negotiating Committee and the UNCED in 1992 so that the concerns of SAARC countries could be effectively articulated and projected, keeping in mind their respective national priorities.

29. The Government of India renewed its offer to host a Ministerial Meeting to harmonise the views of SAARC countries on these issues before UNCED 1992. The Heads of State or Government welcomed the offer.

SHELTER

30. The Heads of State or Government noted the useful activities conducted during 1991 which was observed as SAARC Year of Shelter. They decided to continue to work towards the global objective of "Shelter for All by the Year 2000".

31. The Heads of State or Government were of the view that Governments should play the critical role of facilitator and supporter of the initiatives of the people and non- governmental agencies in the field of shelter. In this role, they should be involved in the provision of affordable sites with secure tenure, making housing finance available on an affordable and sustainable basis, providing infrastructure development such as water supply and sanitation, energy and waste disposal, increasing the supply of building materials at reasonable prices using indigenous resources, removing constraints to building activities, and creating maximum oppor-

tunities for public participation in decision making and management of shelter activities in the overall context of poverty alleviation. Such activities would be facilitated by the exchange of experience, personnel, research and information among the SAARC countries.

32. The Heads of State or Government welcomed the recommendation on the establishment of a shelter information network to be called "SHELTERNET".

CHILDREN

33. The Heads of State or Government accorded the highest priority to the question of child survival, protection and development. They welcomed the adoption of a Plan of Action on Children for South Asia which incorporated relevant recommendations of the World Summit on Children.

34. The Heads of State or Government noted in this context that some member countries had completed their national Plans of Action and urged other member countries to complete their respective Plans. They also urged Member- States to ensure coordinated follow-up action on their respective Plans.

35. The Heads of State or Government welcomed the offer of Sri Lanka to host a Conference on Children in South Asia in 1992 to consider implementation of the regional Plan of Action.

36. The Heads of State or Government welcomed the adoption of the Plan of Action for 1991 - 2000 A.D. as the SAARC Decade of the Girl Child. They requested the Council of Ministers to ensure an annual review of the status of implementation of the Plan of Action during the decade.

TERRORISM

37. The Heads of State or Government expressed serious concern on the spread of terrorism in the region affecting the security and stability of all member-states and unequivocally condemned all acts, methods and practices of terrorism as criminal. They deplored all such acts for their impact on life, property, socio-economic development and political stability as well as on regional and international peace and cooperation.

38. They recognised that cooperation among SAARC States was vital if terrorism was to be prevented and eliminated from the region. In this regard they urged member-states to take all necessary measures to give full effect to their obligations under the SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism. They stressed in particular, the urgent need for the expeditious enactment of enabling legislation by those member-states which had not yet done so, for the implementation of the Convention and the need for a constant dialogue and interaction among the concerned agencies of member-states, including submission of periodic recommendations to the Council of Ministers.

SECURITY OF SMALL STATES

39. The Heads of State or Government welcomed the initiative of the Government of the Republic of Maldives in drawing the attention of the international community to the protection and security of small states. They noted with satisfaction that the resolution submitted by the Maldives to the United Nations during the 46th Session of the General Assembly and co-sponsored by 65 countries including all the members of SAARC was adopted without a vote. They agreed that small states may be particularly vulnerable to external threats and acts of interference in their internal affairs and that they merit special measures of support in safeguarding their sovereign independence, territorial integrity and the welfare of their people.

DRUG TRAFFICKING

40. The Heads of State or Government noted with satisfaction the increasing regional cooperation in combating the problem of drug trafficking and drug abuse. They expressed serious concern over the growing linkages between drug trafficking, international arms trade and terrorist activities. While expressing satisfaction at the signing of the SAARC Convention on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic substances at the Fifth SAARC Summit at Male, they urged member-states which had not yet done so to ratify the Convention for its entry into force. They also recognized the need for greater cooperation, including the submission of periodic recommendations to the Council of Ministers.

PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE CONTACT

41. The Heads of State or Government recalled that important initiatives had been taken at the Bangalore and Kathmandu Summits which had sub-

sequently resulted in the increased involvement of the peoples of South Asia in the process of Regional Cooperation. They welcomed the steps being taken by business organisations/professional bodies, scholars, academics, National Cultural Councils and the media in South Asia to form regional entities/ bodies. They called on the Standing Committee to expedite the formulation of guidelines for extending recognition to such groups and bodies.

FUND FOR REGIONAL PROJECTS

42. The Heads of State or Government welcomed the setting up of a SAARC Fund for Regional Projects (SFRP) for identification and development of regional projects. They noted that the Fund would be managed by a Regional Council of Development Financing Institutions of the SAARC Member States and that the First Meeting of the Council would take place in India.

SOUTH ASIAN DEVELOPMENT FUND

43. The Heads of State or Government requested the Secretary-General of SAARC to set up a panel of experts to examine the proposal of His Majesty the King of Bhutan to undertake a pre-feasibility study for the establishment of a South Asian Development Fund, taking into account the views of all member-states.

SAARC VISA EXEMPTION SCHEME

44. The Heads of State or Government noted with satisfaction that the Scheme in regard to the entitled categories of Members of Parliament, Judges of the Supreme Court, Heads of national academic institutions and the accompanying spouses and dependent children will become operational from 1st March 1992. They called for expeditious action to implement the scheme as well as to consider other categories eligible for exemeption.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

45. The Heads of State or Government were conscious of the vast potential being afforded by current advances in scientific research for the application of science and technology towards the well-being of the peoples of

South Asia. They agreed that for the South Asian region to derive the maximum benefit, scientific and technological cooperation should transcend national frontiers.

46. Recalling the decision of the Male Summit to institutionalise cooperation in the field of bio-technology, they welcomed the proposal for the establishment of a networking arrangement between Research and Development Centres in the member-states as an important step in advancing such cooperation. They also welcomed the emphasis on organised study tours, workshops and seminars proposed in the identified areas of cooperation in the field of science and technology.

DATE AND VENUE OF THE SEVENTH MEETING OF THE SAARC HEADS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT

47. The Heads of State or Government gratefully accepted the offer of the Government of Bangladesh to host the the Seventh SAARC Summit in 1992.

48. The Heads of State or Government of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal and Pakistan expressed their deep appreciation for the exemplary manner in which the President of Sri Lanka had discharged his responsibilities as Chairman of the Meeting. They expressed their profound gratitude for the warm and gracious hospitality extended to them by the Government and the people of Sri Lanka and for the excellent arrangements made for the Meeting.

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S/23513
4 February 1992

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FURTHER REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 721 (1991)

INTRODUCTION

1. The present further report is being submitted to the Security Council pursuant to its resolution 721 (1991), which was adopted unanimously on 27 November 1991. In addition, it takes into account resolution 727 (1992) of 8 January 1992, which the Council also adopted unanimously and by which, inter alia, it approved my report 1/ of 5 January 1992.

2. It will be recalled that the Security Council, in its resolution 721 (1991), expressed the hope that the Secretary-General would present early recommendations to the Council including the possible establishment of a United Nations peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia. In resolution 724 (1991), the Security Council endorsed my predecessor's view, expressed in his report 2/ of 11 December 1991, that the conditions for establishing a peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia still did not exist. In resolution 727 (1992) the Council welcomed the signing of an implementing accord at Sarajevo on 2 January 1992, concerning modalities for implementing the unconditional cease-fire agreed to by the parties at Geneva on 23 November 1991, 3/ and endorsed my intention to send to Yugoslavia a group of up to 50 military liaison officers to promote maintenance of the cease-fire.

3. The military liaison mission, headed by Col. John Wilson (Australia) and consisting of unarmed officers detached from three existing United Nations peace-keeping operations, arrived in Yugoslavia on 14 January 1992. On Thursday, 23 January, I received a visit from Mr. Branko Jovic, Chairman of the Federal State Committee for Cooperation with the United Nations on Peace-keeping Matters. On the same day I received a visit from Mr. F. Greguric, Prime Minister of the Republic of Croatia. Both visitors reiterated the commitments of their respective authorities to the cease-fire and requested the earliest possible deployment of a peace-keeping operation. I responded that there remained a number of obstacles in the way of such a deployment, bearing in mind the resolutions of the Council on the subject, but that I had asked the Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs,

Mr. Marrack Goulding, to travel to the area to assess the state of the cease-fire and to examine how those obstacles could be removed. This was also intended to be a signal to the parties that I wished to be of help to them. Mr. Goulding arrived in Belgrade on 26 January 1992, accompanied by Col. Heikki Purola, my Deputy Military Adviser, and Mr. Shashi Tharoor, Special Assistant to the Under-Secretary-General. Col. Wilson also formed part of the delegation.

4. Mr. Goulding held discussions in Belgrade on 26 January 1992 with political and military leaders there. On the following day he met leaders of the Serbian community in Eastern Slavonia and then travelled to Knin for discussions with the leadership of the Serbian community in the region of Krajina, the largest of the proposed United Nations Protected Areas. On 28 January he met with the Croatian leadership in Zagreb. On 29 January he held further consultations in Belgrade with the political and military leadership there and met a delegation of the Serbian community of Western Slavonia. The meetings with the leaders of the Serbian communities in the three United Nations Protected Areas took place in response to requests by the Federal and Serbian leaderships that Mr. Goulding should give the local leaders a further explanation of the plan for a United Nations peace-keeping force and respond to the concerns which they had expressed about it. Mr. Goulding and his team returned to New York on 30 January 1992. A full description of their programme is attached as annex I to the present report.

I. SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS AND FINDINGS

5. During his discussions with political and military leaders in Yugoslavia, Mr. Goulding sought to identify ways of removing the principal obstacles that remained to the deployment of a peace-keeping operation. He pointed out to the parties that, before such an operation could be deployed, it would be necessary for them to observe an unconditional and effective cease-fire, the modalities for the implementation of which had been agreed in the Sarajevo accord; 1/ to accept, fully and explicitly, the concept paper for a United Nations peace-keeping force 4/ and the practical details of its implementation; and to make an unconditional commitment to ensure full cooperation with such a peace-keeping force should the Security Council decide to establish it. The paragraphs that follow summarize the main points in the report which Mr. Goulding has made to me.

A. The cease-fire

6. In its resolution 721 (1991), the Security Council had endorsed the statement of the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General, Mr. Cyrus R. Vance, that the deployment of a United Nations peace-keeping operation would not be envisaged without, inter alia, full compliance by all parties with the agreement signed at Geneva on 23 November 1991. 3/ Of the provisions of that agreement, the unblocking and withdrawal of Yugoslav National Army (JNA) units

in Croatia had taken place, and satisfactory progress had been made in relation to the humanitarian aspects of the agreement, though the overall humanitarian situation remained grave. However, in my most recent report 1/ of 5 January 1992, I had observed that a lasting, effective and unconditional cease-fire had so far eluded the parties. Following the Sarajevo accord, the mission of the military liaison officers was aimed at assisting the parties to achieve and maintain such a cease-fire by facilitating communication between them and providing good offices to help to defuse any tensions that might arise. A full description of the composition, deployment and functions of the military liaison mission is attached in annex II to the present report.

7. During their two weeks on the ground in Yugoslavia, the military liaison officers have received daily allegations of cease-fire violations. None the less, since the Sarajevo accord went into effect on 3 January 1992, the cease-fire has been generally observed, although there have been sporadic violations. It is, sadly, the case that people are still dying, although the majority of the alleged cease-fire violations on both sides have been comparatively minor. There have been almost no complaints of movements of formations of platoon size or larger and the commanders on both sides have shown evidence, which was lacking before, of a readiness to make serious efforts to respect the cease-fire. Unfortunately, however, the military forces on both sides continue to include irregular armed elements who are not fully under the control of the established military commands and who have been responsible for a substantial proportion of the alleged cease-fire violations. Both parties assured Mr. Goulding that they have taken, and will strengthen, actions to bring these elements under their effective control.

B. The United Nations plan

8. The plan for the deployment of a United Nations peace-keeping force, which had been endorsed and accepted by the principal signatories of the Geneva agreement, as confirmed in paragraphs 11 to 14 of my earlier report, 1/ rests on two central elements: on the one hand, the withdrawal of JNA from all of Croatia and the demilitarization of the United Nations Protected Areas; on the other, the continuing functioning, on an interim basis, of the existing local authorities and police, under United Nations supervision, pending the achievement of an overall political solution to the Yugoslav crisis. This concept had been described in explicit terms to all the principal parties during the recent missions of my Personal Envoy, Mr. Vance, and of the Preparatory Group sent to the area under resolution 724 (1991).

9. On this basis, and in response especially to concerns expressed by the Serbian communities in the United Nations Protected Areas, Mr. Goulding provided the following clarifications and explanations to all interested parties:

(a) As stated in paragraph 5 of the plan, 4/ and subject to the agreement of the Security Council, the United Nations force would not be withdrawn before an overall political solution was found to the Yugoslav

crisis, it being understood that rapid progress would need to be made in the Conference on Yugoslavia;

(b) The deployment of the force would not prejudge the outcome of the political process; on the contrary, its purpose would be to stop the fighting and to create the conditions in which political negotiations could take place;

(c) In respect of arrangements for local government and the maintenance of law and order in the United Nations Protected Areas, the deployment of the force would not change the status quo; police arrangements would be as provided for in paragraph 19 of the plan; 5/

(d) Following from this, the United Nations Protected Areas, as at present, would continue not to be subject to the laws and institutions of the Republic of Croatia during the interim period pending a political settlement;

(e) The force would protect the local population and ensure its safety during and after the demilitarization of the United Nations Protected Areas.

10. In the course of his discussions in Belgrade, Mr. Goulding again received unqualified assurances from Mr. Branko Kostic, Vice-President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Mr. Borisav Jovic, Chairman of the State Committee for Cooperation with the United Nations on Peace-keeping Matters, and General Blagoje Adzic, Acting Federal Secretary of Defence of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Chief of Staff of JNA, that they accepted the plan and would cooperate fully in its implementation. President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia also reiterated his full acceptance of the plan. Mr. Goulding explained to his interlocutors what would be expected of them in relation to the implementation of the plan and was satisfied that they fully understood and accepted their obligations under it.

11. Also in Belgrade, Mr. Goulding met on 27 January with Mr. Goran Hadzic, leader of the Serbian community in the region of Eastern Slavonia, one of the proposed United Nations Protected Areas. Following an exposition of the principles spelled out in paragraph 10 above, Mr. Hadzic expressed reservations about only one aspect of the plan: the reference 6/ to the United Nations Protected Areas being "in Croatia", which in his view prejudged a pending political issue. When Mr. Goulding said that I would record that view in the present report and explore with the Security Council the possibility of emphasizing in a future resolution the point that the peace-keeping force did not prejudge the political negotiations, Mr. Hadzic confirmed his acceptance of the United Nations plan and undertook to cooperate with it. Similar assurances were obtained from Mr. Veljko Dzakula and other members of the leadership of the Serbian community of a second proposed United Nations Protected Area, Western Slavonia, in a meeting with Mr. Goulding on 29 January 1992. (However, subsequent press reports suggest that Mr. Hadzic may have revised his position.)

12. Mr. Milan Babic, the leader of the Serbian community in the third proposed United Nations Protected Area, with whom Mr. Goulding had five hours of discussions in Knin on 27 January, declared his inability, and that of his

colleagues in the "Government" of the self-proclaimed "Republic of Serbian Krajina", to accept the United Nations plan. Like Mr. Hadzic, Mr. Babic expressed the view that the plan's reference to the United Nations Protected Areas as being "in Croatia" was unacceptable because it prejudged the political solution, but he did not consider Mr. Goulding's proposal to cover that point in a Security Council document as offering adequate reassurance. Further, Mr. Babic rejected the demilitarization of the United Nations Protected Areas, stating that, if that was to occur, the Croatian armed forces should also be disarmed. He did not believe that United Nations forces could sufficiently protect the population of the Krajina from Croatian attack, particularly since recent public statements by President Tudjman had portrayed the prospective United Nations operation as a means of asserting the authority of the Republic of Croatia over the territories included in the United Nations Protected Areas. In addition, Mr. Babic stated that the recognition of the Government of Croatia by certain countries and the establishment of the "Republic of Serbian Krajina" required, in accordance with the "doctrine of changed circumstances", a revision of the plan. The plan had been approved by the Security Council before those events; it needed to be recast to resolve the main problem, which was the one existing between his "Government" and that of the Republic of Croatia. Mr. Babic added that only his "Government" could enter into commitments on behalf of his community vis-à-vis the Security Council. The population of the Krajina would therefore refuse to cooperate with the United Nations plan, to surrender their weapons or to permit JNA to withdraw. As an alternative, Mr. Babic proposed that United Nations forces should deploy along either side of the present front lines of the conflict, an option already rejected by the Croatian authorities. Mr. Goulding declined to alter a plan that had already been agreed by the main parties and approved by the Council.

13. In Zagreb on 28 January, President Franjo Tudjman and senior members of his Government also stated that they could not accept a fundamental aspect of the plan, thus retracting the full and unconditional acceptance of it that had been conveyed to my Personal Envoy, Mr. Cyrus R. Vance, on 1 January. Mr. Tudjman's objection related to the proposed arrangements for local government and the maintenance of public order. 7/ He said that he could not accept any formula that did not provide for the immediate restoration of the full authority of the Republic of Croatia in the United Nations Protected Areas. The latter would have to function under the Constitution and laws of Croatia and all local government institutions (including the police) would have to be accountable to Zagreb. When it was pointed out that the United Nations force's deployment would be for an interim period only pending the outcome of political negotiations on an overall settlement, Mr. Tudjman stated that, following the international recognition of his Republic, there were no political issues left to negotiate. Mr. Goulding pointed out that that retraction of Mr. Tudjman's acceptance of the plan would, if maintained, remove one of its two central elements and invalidate the basis on which the other parties had accepted it. However, despite five hours of discussion, Mr. Goulding was unable to overcome this new and unexpected obstacle to the deployment of the United Nations force.

II. OBSERVATIONS

14. There are a number of positive and encouraging elements in Mr. Goulding's report and one discouraging element.

15. The cease-fire is generally holding. In recent days there has, however, been a marked increase in the number of allegations of cease-fire violations, although it has not been possible to confirm most of them. It is important that both sides should redouble their efforts to bring irregular elements under control and that they should respect scrupulously all other provisions of the Sarajevo accord of 2 January 1992. But I am persuaded that the level of violations reported by Mr. Goulding, which I hope, of course, will be reduced, is not sufficiently grave to make it impossible to deploy a United Nations peace-keeping force, if the other necessary conditions for such deployment are fulfilled.

16. To judge from its first two weeks of operations, the group of United Nations military liaison officers that was deployed to Yugoslavia in mid-January is making a significant contribution to the efforts of the international community to help the Yugoslav parties to maintain and strengthen the cease-fire. In particular, I am pleased to learn that a workable division of labour with the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM) has been established and that the two groups are working together in a harmonious and complementary way to achieve the common goal. In paragraph 22 below I recommend that the United Nations group should now be modestly enlarged for technical reasons related to the fact that its deployment in Yugoslavia now seems likely to be rather longer than originally envisaged.

17. Mr. Goulding was able to confirm that two of the signatories of the Geneva agreement of 23 November 1991, together with the remaining elements of the Federal leadership in Belgrade, continue to maintain their complete acceptance of, and support for, the plan and are indeed anxious that the United Nations force should be deployed at the earliest possible time. At his meetings, Mr. Goulding was also able to win acceptance of the plan by the local Serbian leaders in two of the three areas where the force would be deployed, although one of his interlocutors appears to have had second thoughts.

18. I am also encouraged by the decision of Lord Carrington, Chairman of the Conference on Yugoslavia, to visit Yugoslavia in the coming days in order to discuss with the parties concerned the next stages of the Conference's work. The main purpose of the United Nations force is, of course, to help to create conditions for the Conference to succeed in negotiating an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis. I do not believe that the members of the Security Council would wish a large and expensive force to remain deployed in Yugoslavia indefinitely, and it is important, therefore, that all the Yugoslav parties should demonstrate their readiness to work purposefully and quickly in the Conference on Yugoslavia.

19. The discouraging element in the situation reported by Mr. Goulding is that one of the signatories of the Geneva agreement and another party on whose cooperation the United Nations force's ability to carry out its tasks would depend appear to have rejected key elements in the plan. I regret to have to conclude that the positions currently adopted by the Government of Croatia and by the local leaders in what would be the Krajina United Nations Protected Area would, if maintained, constitute major obstacles to a decision by the Security Council to establish and deploy the peace-keeping operation described in annex III to my report of 11 December 1991, 2/ which was approved by resolution 724 (1991).

20. If this operation is to be launched, as is widely desired in Yugoslavia and by the international community at large, action needs to be taken to convince the Government of Croatia and the Serbian leadership in Krajina that the early deployment of a United Nations force, accompanied by a resumption of the work of the Conference on Yugoslavia, is the best, and perhaps the only, available way to create the conditions for a peaceful resolution of the Yugoslav crisis. On 3 February 1992, the Permanent Representative of Yugoslavia transmitted to me a communication from the Vice-President of the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Mr. Branko Kostic, informing me that "the Serbian representatives" of the proposed United Nations Protected Areas had given their consent to the plan. Mr. Kostic's letter is attached as annex III. However, on the same day a number of messages were received from Mr. Milan Babic denying that he had accepted the plan and repeating his objections to it. The question of whether or not a peace-keeping force deployed in the Krajina United Nations Protected Area would receive the necessary cooperation thus, unfortunately, remains unclear.

21. In these circumstances it is all the more necessary for action to be taken quickly in order to forestall any tendency for the current cease-fire to unravel. In this context, I have been disturbed to hear of allegations, including in the media, that the arms embargo imposed by the Security Council in resolution 713 (1991) is not being observed. In the circumstances, it is all the more essential that the arms embargo be scrupulously respected, and the Security Council will no doubt wish to keep the situation under careful scrutiny in order to ensure this. In addition, it would be helpful if the Council could urge that all those who are in a position to influence the parties would make every effort to convince them to accept, and cooperate with, the United Nations peace-keeping plan. I, my Personal Envoy and my staff remain ready to extend any assistance which the Council may consider appropriate.

22. It is clear that the circumstances described above do not permit me to recommend the deployment of a United Nations peace-keeping force at this time. This makes it necessary to consider the future of the United Nations military liaison officers who were deployed in Yugoslavia in January 1992 to help to consolidate the cease-fire. Their mission was conceived of as a brief interim arrangement, pending an early decision by the Security Council on the possible deployment of a larger force. The group's strength was accordingly decided on the assumption that its mission would be for a period of only four weeks. The group has shown that it is able to make an important contribution to the maintenance of the cease-fire, and I therefore recommend that it should

remain in existence. However, its strength needs to be increased for strictly technical reasons, now that it has become clear that it may be required for a longer period than originally envisaged. On the basis of advice received from Col. Wilson, I propose that the authorized strength should be increased to 75 military liaison officers, who would continue to be drawn from existing United Nations peace-keeping operations. Some additional international and local support staff would also be required. A preliminary estimate of the costs of this increase will be presented shortly to the Security Council as an addendum to the present report.

Notes

1/ S/23363.

2/ S/23280.

3/ S/23239.

4/ S/23280, annex III.

5/ Ibid., para. 19, the text of which reads as follows:

"The maintenance of public order in the United Nations Protected Areas would be the responsibility of local police forces who would carry only side-arms. Each of these forces would be formed from residents of the United Nations Protected Area in question, in proportions reflecting the national composition of the population which lived in it before the recent hostilities. The local police forces would be responsible to the existing opstine councils in the United Nations Protected Areas. Any existing regional police structures would remain in place, provided that they were consistent with the principle described above concerning the national composition of the local police forces."

6/ Ibid., paras. 7 and 8.

7/ Ibid., para. 19.

Annex I

Programme of the mission led by Mr. Marrack Goulding, Under-Secretary-General, to Yugoslavia

26-30 January 1992

Sunday, 26 January 1992

1530 Arrive Belgrade

1600 Briefing by Col. John Wilson, Senior Military Liaison Officer

1715-1900 Meeting with Mr. Branko Kostic, Vice-President of the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and members of the State Committee for Cooperation with the United Nations on Peace-keeping Matters

1915-2115 Meeting and working dinner with Mr. Slobodan Milosevic, President of the Republic of Serbia, and Mr. Vladislav Jovanovic, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Serbia

2125-2245 Meeting with General Blagoje Adzic, Acting Federal Secretary of Defence of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Chief of Staff of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA), accompanied by Admiral Stane Brovet, Deputy Secretary, Colonel-General A. Raseta and Major-General Slavko Jovic

Monday, 27 January 1992

0915-1045 Meeting with Mr. Goran Hadzic, "President" of the "Government of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sovem" and his delegation

1100 Departure by air for Bihac

1215 Departure by helicopter for Knin

1315-1530 Meeting with Mr. Milan Babic, "President" of the "Government of the Republic of Serbian Krajina" and his delegation

1530-1700 Working lunch with members of Mr. Babic's delegation

1710-1815 Meeting with Major-General Ratko Mladic, Commander of the Knin Corps of JNA

1920-2345 Resumed meeting with Mr. Babic and his delegation, followed by a working dinner

Tuesday, 28 January 1992

0530	Working breakfast with General Mladic
0615	Departure by road for Zagreb
1115	Arrival in Zagreb, having crossed the front lines at Karlovac
1130-1200	Meeting with Ambassador Joao Salgueiro, Head of the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM)
1215-1545	Meeting with Mr. Franjo Tudjman, President of the Republic of Croatia, accompanied by Mr. D. Sarinic, Chef de Cabinet; Mr. G. Susak, Minister of Defence; Mr. Z. Separovic, Foreign Minister; Mr. B. Salaj, Minister of Information; and Mr. M. Nobilo, Adviser
1545-1700	Working lunch with President Tudjman and his colleagues
2000-2240	Resumed meeting with President Tudjman and, in addition to earlier delegation, Mr. Franjo Greguric, Prime Minister, Mr. S. Mesic, former President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and General Anton Tus, Chief of Staff of the Croatian Army
2300	Dinner with Ambassador Salgueiro and senior members of ECMM

Wednesday, 29 January 1992

0830	Briefing by United Nations military liaison officers, Zagreb sector, followed by courtesy visit to Brigadier-General Stolnik, Croatian Army
0930	Depart by road for Bihac
1230	Depart by air from Bihac
1330	Arrive Belgrade
1430	Briefing by United Nations military liaison officers, Belgrade sector
1530	Meeting with Mr. B. Jovic, Chairman of the State Committee for Cooperation with the United Nations on Peace-keeping Matters and members of the Committee
1700	Meeting with Mr. Veljko Dzakula, "President of the Government" of Western Slavonia, and his delegation
1745	Meeting with President Milosevic and Foreign Minister Jovanovic
1930-2300	Meeting with General Adzic and his staff, followed by working dinner

Thursday, 30 January 1992

0900	Departure for Belgrade airport
1030	Arrive in Vienna; meeting at airport with Mr. Alois Mock, Foreign Minister of Austria
1145	Departure for New York

Annex II

Composition, deployment and functions of the United Nations Military Liaison Mission in Yugoslavia

A. Composition and deployment

1. Fifty military liaison officers of the following nationalities, Australia, Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, Finland, France, Ghana, Ireland, Kenya, Malaysia, Norway, Russian Federation, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Venezuela, detached from existing peace-keeping operations (United Nations Angola Verification Mission II, United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission and United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine) were assembled in Vienna for briefings on 12 and 13 January 1992 with the assistance of the United Nations Office at Vienna and with exemplary cooperation from the Austrian authorities.

2. Some of the military liaison officers were deployed to both sides in Yugoslavia on 14 January 1992, by road to Zagreb and by air to Belgrade, with the cooperation of the parties. The remainder travelled from Vienna to the United Nations Supply Depot at Pisa and picked up vehicles, equipped high frequency radios and other essential equipment, which they then drove to Yugoslavia. The deployment of the military liaison officers was completed by 19 January 1992.

3. The military liaison officers are deployed at the General Headquarters of the Croatian Army in Zagreb, the General Headquarters of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) in Belgrade and at zone headquarters of the Croatian Army and corps headquarters of JNA at the following locations:

JNA	Croatian Army
Belgrade	Zagreb
Dalj	Osijek
Sid	Bjelovar
Banja Luka	Karlovac
Bihac	Krasno Polje
Knin	Zadar
Bilece	Dubrovnik

B. Functions

4. The military liaison officers have been instructed:

(a) To establish permanent, direct and secure United Nations communications between the military liaison officers attached to the General Headquarters and corps/zone headquarters of each side;

(b) To make their good offices available to promote maintenance of the cease-fire;

(c) To facilitate communications between the two sides;

(d) To help the two sides to determine measures, based on the provisions of the Sarajevo accord, that can be taken to avoid violations of the cease-fire or to restore the status quo after violations occur.

5. The military liaison officers have worked harmoniously with the European Community Monitors. The Senior Military Liaison Officer has coordinated the activities of the liaison officers with his ECMM counterpart through regular contact with the ECMM headquarters in Zagreb and Belgrade. ECMM has remained primarily responsible for monitoring breaches of the cease-fire on the ground, in accordance with the existing memoranda of understanding, which have remained unchanged. The military liaison officers have fulfilled a liaison function across the lines, at the levels of General Headquarters and zone/corps headquarters. The military liaison officers and ECMM exchange daily situation reports. Both the head of ECMM, Ambassador J. Salgueiro, and the Senior Military Liaison Officer, Colonel J. Wilson, have assured Mr. Goulding that the present arrangement is working very well.

Annex III

Letter dated 3 February 1992 from the Permanent Representative of Yugoslavia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have just received a message from the Vice-President of the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Mr. Branko Kostic, concerning the United Nations peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia, which I am forwarding to you.

(Signed) Darko SILOVIC
Permanent Representative of
Yugoslavia to the
United Nations

Enclosure

Letter dated 3 February 1992 from Mr. Branko Kostic, Vice-President of the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia addressed to the Secretary-General

I would like to inform you that the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has conducted extensive consultations with all the relevant factors in the country concerning the arrival and engagement of United Nations peace forces in Yugoslavia, proposed by your personal envoy Mr. Cyrus Vance.

During these consultations, carried out on 31 January and 1 and 2 February, the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia secured the consent to the proposed peace operation plan and the engagement of United Nations forces also of the Serbian representatives in the afflicted areas, which will, according to item 9 of the plan, a/ be placed under the protection of the United Nations.

Accepting the arrival of the peace forces, the legitimate representatives of the population of these areas made some proposals, which Mr. Marrack Goulding, United Nations Under-Secretary-General was informed of during his recent visit to Yugoslavia, and which were also supported and agreed to by the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as meriting discussion and being taken into consideration. However, irrespective of this, the competent federal bodies and the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia hereby extend full guarantees to the Security Council for the unhindered reception and efficient action of United Nations forces, as well as the cooperation of local authorities in the mentioned areas, with a view to preserving peace and ensuring conditions for a peaceful and comprehensive settlement of the Yugoslav crisis.

In view of the above, the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia looks forward to the full understanding and support of the Security Council for the earliest possible adoption of a decision on sending United Nations peace forces to Yugoslavia.

Notes

a/ S/23280, annex III, para. 9.